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I. INTRODUCTION 
The current European Union (“EU”) copyright framework, a set of 
approximately ten directives,1 is governed principally by Directive 
2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 
on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society (“InfoSoc Directive”).  With this governing piece of 
legislation “adopted before Facebook and YouTube even existed,” 
Europeans have found the rules “too inflexible to be adaptable to new forms 
of using cultural works.”2 For instance, companies providing digital 
copyright content—such as Netflix or Google Play—must license their 
services on a country-by-country basis.3 Frequently, companies that hold a 
license in one country do not hold a license to provide the same content in 
another EU country.4 As a result, Europeans are often blocked from 
accessing online content depending on their geographic location.5 
Recognizing the need to modernize the copyright framework “in light of the 
digital revolution and changed consumer behavior,”6 the European 
Parliament tasked Member of the European Parliament (“MEP”) rapporteur 
Julia Reda with drafting legislation to guide the European Commission in 
conforming EU copyright law to the digital age. Toward that end, Parliament 
adopted European Parliament Resolution of 9 July 2015 on the 
Implementation of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of 
 
 1.  See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Towards a Modern, More 
European Copyright Framework, at 3 n.4, COM (2015) 0626 (Dec. 9, 2015) [hereinafter 
Communication]. 
 2.  Zachary Davies Boren, Pirate Party: “We are Literally Rewriting EU Copyright Law, THE 
INDEPENDENT (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/pirate-
party-we-are-literally-rewriting-eu-copyright-law-9958982.html. 
 3.  Nicholas Hirst, Cross-Border Content Complications, POLITICO (May 2, 2014), 
http://www.politico.eu/article/cross-border-content-complications/. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Digital Single Market Strategy for 
Europe, at 2, COM (2015) 192 final (May 6, 2015) [hereinafter Digital Single Market Strategy]. 
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the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of 
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society (“Resolution”).7 
Although non-binding, the Resolution effectively sets forth 
Parliament’s position on pivotal issues facing EU copyright law and calls 
upon the European Commission to consider or adopt a score of its 
recommendations thereon. Responding in part, the Commission has already 
submitted a proposed regulation regarding cross-portability of online content 
services8 and a communication further outlining how it plans on achieving 
“a more modern, more European copyright framework.”9 
With the Commission set to propose further legislation modernizing the 
copyright regime that Parliament and the Council of the European Union 
may then adopt as binding EU-wide law, the Resolution’s significance is 
clear and warrants analysis.10 While not without its merits, the Resolution is 
certainly not without its shortcomings. By taking inconsistent positions on 
territoriality, geo-blocking and contractual relations between right holders, 
urging a reduction in the duration of copyright protection, and failing to 
request legislation establishing a single European copyright title, the 
Resolution and subsequent legislation complicate the copyright regime 
which Parliament and the Council have a duty to resolve via a single 
European copyright title. 
Toward that end, Section II of this article will summarize and identify 
the ramifications of the InfoSoc Directive, which prompted the Resolution 
and anticipated copyright reform in Europe. Sections III and IV will identify 
and analyze the Resolution’s merits and shortcomings, respectively. These 
sections will also identify any issues the Commission has subsequently 
addressed via its Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on Ensuring the Cross-Border Portability of Online Content 
Services in the Internal Market (“Proposal”) or communication titled 
Towards a Modern, More European Copyright Framework 
(“Communication”) and provide analysis thereof. Section V will argue that 
Parliament and the Council have a duty to resolve the issues raised by the 
 
 7.  See generally European Parliament Resolution of 9 July 2015 on the Implementation of 
Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 2015 O.J. 
(C 265) [hereinafter Resolution]. 
 8.  See generally Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council to 
Ensure the Cross-Border Portability of Online Content Services in the Internal Market, EUR. PARL. DOC. 
(COM 627) (2015) [hereinafter Proposal]. 
 9.  Communication, supra note 1, at 2. 
 10.  Copyright Reform: Promote Cultural Diversity and Ensure Access to it, Say MEPs, EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT NEWS (July 9, 2015), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/content/20150703IPR73903/html/Copyright-reform-promote-cultural-diversity-and-ensure-
access-to-it-say-MEPs. 
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Resolution, Proposal and Communication via a single European copyright 
title. Finally, Section VI will conclude by summarizing the arguments made 
in previous sections then identifying the pros of establishing a single 
European copyright title. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In late June of 1994, on the Greek island of Corfu, the European Council 
resolved to “create a general and flexible legal framework at Community 
level in order to foster the development of the information society in 
Europe.”11 Copyright law, therefore, needed to be “adapted and 
supplemented to respond adequately to economic realities such as new forms 
of exploitation” brought about by the digital revolution.12 Toward that end, 
and to implement the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright 
Treaty, Parliament and the Council adopted the InfoSoc Directive in 2001 
with the dual purpose of harmonizing the legal framework on copyright to 
thereby increase legal certainty.13 Despite these lofty intentions, the InfoSoc 
Directive actuated legal calamity, the chief culprits of which are Articles 5 
and 6.   
A. Article 5 of the InfoSoc Directive 
Article 5 enunciates a host of exceptions and limitations that Member 
States14 may, but are not obligated to, adopt.15 The permissive nature of these 
exceptions and limitations allows Member States to cherry-pick exceptions 
and limitations as they see fit. Not surprisingly, different Member States 
have adopted different exceptions and limitations, so what may be legal in 
one country may be illegal in another.16 For example, Article 5, Section 3(h) 
allows Member States to provide an exception or limitation for “use of 
 
 11.  Directive 2001/29/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 2001 O.J. 
(L 167) 10 [hereinafter Directive 2001/29/EC]. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Member States are those nations that are members of the European Union: Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  Countries, EUROPA (Jan. 25, 2016), 
http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm. 
 15.  Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 10, at art. 5 §§ 2–4. 
 16.  Eleonora Rosati, EU Parliament Rejects Restrictions on Freedom of Panorama and Ancillary 
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works, such as works of architecture or sculpture, made to be located 
permanently in public places,” otherwise known as the freedom of panorama 
exception.17 While most Member States provide for freedom of panorama in 
some form, many do not and the map below depicts this incongruity.18 
Countries with complete freedom of panorama are green; countries that limit 
freedom of panorama to buildings are light green; countries where freedom 
of panorama exists only for non-commercial use of photos of public artworks 




 17.  Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 10, at art. 5 § 3(h). 
 18.  Julia Reda, Freedom of Panorama Under Threat, JULIA REDA (June 22, 2015), 
https://juliareda.eu/2015/06/fop-under-threat/. 
 19.  Id. 
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At first blush, these laws may appear problematic only to professional 
photographers or videographers, but to hold so would be remiss. To 
understand how these laws have the potential to affect the average European 
and tourist alike, consider the following example. In France, as in the United 
States, architectural works are copyrightable subject matter and therefore 
protected for the life of the author, plus seventy years.20 If the term of 
protection has not expired and thereby placed the work within the public 
domain, reproductions of such works require consent of the current right 
holder.21 Tourists rejoice, for the 125-year-old Eiffel Tower is well within 
the public domain and so may be freely photographed or sketched—but only 
before its lights go on.22 As it were, a special lighting design was installed in 
1989 to commemorate the tower’s 100th anniversary which the Cour de 
Cassation held in 1992 was an “original ‘visual creation’” protected by 
copyright.23 Commercial use of a photograph of the Eiffel Tower at night 
therefore requires prior authorization by the Société d’Exploitation de la 
Tour Eiffel (“SETE”), the organization that operates the tower.24 
Considering, however, the vast majority of people visiting the Eiffel 
Tower are unlikely to offer their photographs of the tower commercially, one 
may wonder how laws restricting the freedom of panorama actually affect 
the average European or tourist. To put it simply, the trouble occurs when 
those photographs are posted on social media platforms such as Facebook. 
By agreeing to Facebook’s Terms of Service, users permit Facebook to use 
their “name, profile picture, content, and information in connection with 
commercial . . . content.”25 Assent to Facebook’s terms also means users 
agree to “not post content . . . that infringes or violates someone else’s 
rights.”26 Posting on Facebook a photograph of the Eiffel Tower illuminated 
at night without SETE’s prior authorization thus turns what would otherwise 
be a noncommercial use into a commercial use and thereby violates SETE’s 
copyright, as well as Facebook’s Terms of Service.  
 
 20.  Compare Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle [Intellectual Property Code] arts. L112-2 and 
L123-1 [hereinafter French Intellectual Property Code], with U.S. Copyright Code, 17 U.S.C. § 102 
(1990). 
 21.  French Intellectual Property Code, supra note 19, at art. L122-4. 
 22.  Steve Schlackman, Do Night Photos of the Eiffel Tower Violate Copyright?, ART LAW 
JOURNAL (Nov. 16, 2014), http://artlawjournal.com/night-photos-eiffel-tower-violate-copyright/. 
 23.  Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Mar. 3, 1992, Bull. civ. 
I, No. 90-18081 (Fr.) (“les formes du monument constituait une ‘création visuelle’ originale”) [“the forms 
of the monument constituted an original ‘visual creation’”]. 
 24.  Filming and Image Shots—Professionals, TOUREIFFEL.PARIS, 
http://www.toureiffel.paris/en/the-eiffel-tower-image-and-brand/filming-at-the-eiffel-tower.html. 
 25.  Terms of Service, § 9.1, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php. 
 26.  Id. § 5.1. 
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Aside from allowing Member States to enact such odd laws with respect 
to freedom of panorama, the optional nature of Article 5 of the InfoSoc has, 
above all, needlessly created legal uncertainty. Because most Member States 
are only a few hours away by train from each other, it is entirely possible for 
Europeans and tourists alike to find themselves in two, perhaps three, 
separate Member States in a single day—some of which may provide for 
freedom of panorama, some of which may not. To continue with the Eiffel 
Tower example above, someone who takes a photograph of the Eiffel Tower 
at night could travel through France and Belgium, into the Netherlands and 
end up in Amsterdam photographing the “I amsterdam” letters just three 
hours and twenty minutes later.27 During this relatively short time, the 
photographer would be confronted with antithetical legal systems: the 
Netherlands affords complete freedom of panorama, whereas France and 
Belgium do not.28 Likely unbeknownst to him, the photographer’s pictures 
of the Eiffel Tower may thus expose him to liability for copyright 
infringement while his pictures of the “I amsterdam” letters are protected by 
the freedom of panorama. With such laws that only those familiar with the 
nuances of copyright law are likely to be aware of, but all are affected by, 
the InfoSoc Directive missed the mark with regard to providing legal 
certainty. 
B. Article 6 of the InfoSoc Directive 
Unlike Article 5, however, Article 6 requires Member States to provide 
protections against circumvention of technological protection measures for 
copyrighted works.29 Article 6(1) states that “Member States shall provide 
adequate legal protection against the circumvention of any effective 
technological measures, which the person concerned carries out in the 
knowledge, or with reasonable grounds to know, that he or she is pursuing 
that objective.”30 
Because “circumvention usually takes place by means of a device,”31 
Article 6(2) requires Member States to: 
 
provide adequate legal protection against the manufacture, 
import, distribution, sale, rental, advertisement for sale or 
 
 27.  Eurail Map of Train Routes in Europe, EURAIL.COM, http://www.eurail.com/plan-your-
trip/railway-map#traveltime. 
 28.  Reda, supra note 17. 
 29.  See generally Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 10, at art. 6. 
 30.  Id. at art. 6(1). 
 31.  Alvise M. Casellati, The Evolution of Article 6.4 of the European Information Society 
Copyright Directive, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 369, 377 (2001). 
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rental, or possession for commercial purposes of devices, 
products or components or the provision of services which: 
 
(a) are promoted, advertised or marketed for the 
purpose of circumvention of, or 
(b) have only a limited commercially significant 
purpose or use other than to circumvent, or 
(c) are primarily designed, produced, adapted or 
performed for the purpose of enabling or facilitating the 
circumvention of, any effective technological measures.32 
 
Recognizing that such requirements may infringe upon the so-called 
“public policy exceptions” of Article 5,33 e.g., those regarding photocopying, 
copy and archive purposes of educational facilities, broadcaster’s own 
ephemeral recordings, non-commercial broadcasts, teaching and research, 
use by disabled individuals, and public safety,34 Article 6(4) subparagraph 1 
requires Member States to also take measures to ensure that the public is not 
denied the benefit of those exceptions by the protective measures mandated 
by Article 6(1) and (2).35 It is interesting to note that despite the permissive 
nature of Article 5, Article 6(4) subparagraph 1 requires Member States to 
take such measures and therefore turns these permissive exceptions into 
mandatory exceptions in all Member States. Similarly, although not 
required, Article 6(4) subparagraph 2 allows Member States to take measures 
to ensure that beneficiaries of the private copying exception delineated in 
Article 5(b)(2) are not denied the benefit of that exception by Article 6(1) 
and (2).36 
Apparently anticipating, but perhaps underestimating, the rise of video-
on-demand services and the need to protect such markets, the Commission 
added Article 6(4) subparagraph 4, which states: “[t]he provisions of the first 
and second subparagraphs shall not apply to the works or other subject-
matter made available to the public on agreed contractual terms in such a 
way that members of the public may access them from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them.”37 Simply put, EU copyright law does not 
 
 32.  Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 10, at art. 6(2). 
 33.  Id. at arts. 5(2)(a), (2)(c), (2)(d), (2)(e), (3)(a), (3)(b) and (3)(e). 
 34.  See id. at art. 5 
 35.  Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 10, at art. 6(4), ¶ 1. 
 36.  Id. at art. 6(4), ¶ 2. 
 37.  Id. at art. 6(4), ¶ 4. 
 
  
2017 WHY THE DIGITAL AGE DEMANDS A SINGLE EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT TITLE 45 
require Member States to do anything to ensure that parties to contracts 
providing on-demand access to copyright works like Netflix are actually able 
to access those works. This subparagraph, therefore, establishes that 
copyright exceptions are not applicable to on-demand services and that 
contract law controls such services. What is troublesome about this, though, 
is that companies providing on-demand services typically license their 
services on a country-by-country basis.38 Frequently, these companies do not 
hold licenses in every Member State which means many Europeans are often 
blocked from accessing content they pay for when visiting other countries. 
Because geo-restrictions are generally written into service agreements,39 
Europeans have no legal basis to challenge these restrictions. As a result, 
many Europeans resolve to circumvent such restrictions through virtual 
private networks (“VPN’s”).40 VPN’s allow users to disguise their IP address 
so that it appears as if they are in a country that is licensed to access the 
content41 and, as it stands, approximately twenty percent of European users 
use them to access digital content.42 Ironically, by adopting Article 6(4) 
subparagraph 4 the Commission instigated the type of circumvention that the 
same article aimed at preventing. As Vice-President of the European 
Commission Andrus Ansip noted, “[European] legislation is pushing people 
to steal.”43 
As the examples above demonstrate, the InfoSoc Directive has created 
legal discord among Member States and is ill equipped for a post-digital 
revolution society. Fortunately, legislation to harmonize and conform 
European copyright law to the digital age is already underway with the 
Commission’s Digital Single Market Strategy and Parliament’s Resolution, 
the latter of which will be analyzed and evaluated below. 
III. MERITS OF RESOLUTION 
Although the Resolution is not binding, it does present Parliament’s 
position on several pivotal issues facing the EU copyright regime. As such, 
it will undoubtedly inform the Commission in drafting legislation to update 
copyright law to the digital age and, at the very least, indicates what will be 
 
 38.  Hirst, supra note 3. 
 39.  Terms of Use, § 6(c), NETFLIX, https://www.netflix.com/TermsOfUse. 
 40.  Andrew Tarantola, VPNs: What They Do, How They Work, and Why You’re Dumb for Not 
Using One, GIZMODO (Mar. 26, 2013), http://gizmodo.com/5990192/vpns-what-they-do-how-they-
work-and-why-youre-dumb-for-not-using-one (defining VPN’s); see also Andy, EU: Copyright 
Legislation is Pushing People to Piracy, TORRENTFREAK (June 9, 2015), https://torrentfreak.com/eu-
copyright-legislation-is-pushing-people-to-piracy-150609/. 
 41.  Tarantola, supra note 40. 
 42.  Andy, supra note 40. 
 43.  Id. 
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important to Parliament when voting on that legislation. It is therefore 
appropriate to analyze and evaluate the Resolution, as well as to consider its 
ramifications. 
Notwithstanding the shortcomings discussed infra, the Resolution 
laudably advocates for several significant changes in the EU copyright 
regime. Among the Resolution’s noteworthy merits are its preservation of 
freedom of panorama, cognizance of consumers’ rights, and requests for new 
exceptions and limitations. 
A. Freedom of Panorama 
“Freedom of panorama is the unrestricted right to use photographs of 
public spaces, without infringing [upon] the rights of the architect or the 
visual artist.”44 
This right is permitted under Article 5(3)(h) of the InfoSoc Directive 
which states Member States may provide an exception for the “use of works, 
such as works of architecture or sculpture, made to be located permanently 
in public places.”45 Most Member States have adopted such an exception 
thereby providing for freedom of panorama, but Belgium, France, Greece, 
Italy and Luxembourg have not.46 To harmonize the EU in this regard, 
Paragraph 16 of Julia Reda’s Draft Report “calls on the EU legislator to 
ensure that the use of photographs, video footage or other images of works 
which are permanently located in public places is permitted.”47 Members of 
the European People’s Party, Socialists and Liberals on the legal affairs 
committee rejected this proposal and amended the report to read: “Considers 
that the commercial use of photographs, video footage or other images of 
works which are permanently located in physical public places should 
always be subject to prior authorisation from the authors or any proxy acting 
for them.”48 Recalling the map above, this amendment would turn all green 
 
 44.  Jimmy Wales, If You Want to Keep Sharing Photos for Free, Read This, THE GUARDIAN (July 
3, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jul/03/sharing-photos-freedom-of-
panorama. 
 45.  Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 10, at art. 5(3)(h). 
 46.  Freedom of Panorama in Europe in 2015, WIKIMEDIA (July 4, 2015), 
https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Freedom_of_Panorama_in_Europe_in_2015/Learn_more; see also 
Reda, supra note 18. 
 47.  Draft Report on the Implementation of Directive 2001/21/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights 
in the Information Society (2014/2256(INI)), at 6 (Jan. 15, 2015), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-
546.580+02+DOC+PDF+V0//EN. 
 48.  Amendments 281–556 Draft Report on the Implementation of Directive 2001/21/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of 
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and light green countries either yellow or red.49 This would mean freedom 
of panorama would extend only to publication of photos of public artworks 
for noncommercial purposes or the freedom would not exist at all.50  
Fortunately, European citizens rallied in opposition to the amendment 
and it was subsequently dropped from the final draft of the Resolution.51 The 
freedom of panorama, then, will remain where it is presently envisaged—at 
least for now. As the Communication reports, the Commission “will consider 
legislative proposals on [] EU exceptions by spring 2016” in order to clarify 
certain exceptions.52 Specifically, the Communication expresses the need to 
“clarify the current EU exception” regarding freedom of panorama.53 While 
some have criticized the Commission for not demonstrating a firm 
“commitment to a strong exception for Freedom of Panorama,” it is unlikely 
the Commission will fail to do so in the coming proposals given the outpour 
of public opposition during the drafting stage of the Resolution in the 
summer of 2015.54 Indeed, the Communication’s acknowledgement of the 
importance of freedom of panorama to Europeans constitutes “a step in the 
right direction.”55 As this section of the Communication is the “likely 
consequence” of the Resolution, the Resolution is commendable in that it 
has had a positive influence on the Commission.56 
B. Consumers’ Rights and Geo-blocking 
European copyright theory is underpinned by the droit d’auteur 
(author’s right) tradition, which focuses on the moral rights of the author 
rather than on the rights of consumers or other right holders.57 Interestingly, 
 
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society (2014/2256(INI)), at 70 (Mar. 5, 2015), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=COMPARL&reference=PE-
549.469&format=PDF&language=EN&secondRef=01. 
 49.  Reda, supra note 18. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Nevena Kostova, The EU Copyright Reform Debate is Marked by Diverging Views, EUROPEAN 
FUTURES (July 28, 2015), http://www.europeanfutures.ed.ac.uk/article-1359. 
 52.  Communication, supra note 1, at 8. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Paul Keller, Leaked Copyright Communication: A More Modern Copyright Framework for 
Europe?, COMMUNIA (Nov. 6, 2015), http://www.communia-association.org/2015/11/06/leaked-
copyright-communication-a-more-modern-copyright-framework-for-europe/. 
 55.  Jorge Castro, European Commission Copyright Action Plan: A Busy 2016, CTR. DEMOCRACY 
& TECH. (Dec. 10, 2015), https://cdt.org/blog/european-commission-copyright-action-plan-a-busy-
2016/. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Rainer Kuhlen, Copyright Issues in the European Union—Towards a Science—and 
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however, paragraphs 59 and 67 specifically stress the importance of 
“consumers’ rights.”58 This shift away from the strictly author’s rights 
centered copyright regime is also reflected in the Resolution’s treatment of 
geo-blocking, which often prevents Europeans from accessing digital 
content depending on their geographic location. With the Resolution’s 
drafter, Julia Reda, opining that “this video is not available in your country’ 
message must be a thing of the past,” it is no surprise the issue is repeatedly 
touched on in the final version of the Resolution.59 Indeed, paragraph 9 
points out “that consumers are too often denied access to certain content 
services on geographical grounds, which runs counter to the objective of [the 
InfoSoc Directive] of implementing the four freedoms of the internal 
market.”60 The Resolution in paragraph 11 also “[s]tresses” that the creative 
output of the EU is one of its richest resources, and those who want to enjoy 
it should be able to pay to do so, even when it is only sold in another Member 
State.”61 The Resolution, therefore, urges the Commission “to propose 
adequate solutions for better cross-border accessibility of services and 
copyright content for consumers.”62 Toward that end, the Resolution also 
expresses support for the Commission’s Digital Single Market Strategy 
adopted May 6, 2015.63 By advocating for consumers’ rights to access 
content, the Resolution marks a much needed shift from the largely author-
centered copyright framework towards a system that recognizes that, in the 
information society, consumers also have rights with regard to copyright 
materials. 
 Because approximately twenty percent of European internet users 
employ VPN’s to circumvent geo-blocking measures, creators are losing “a 
huge amount of money.”64 Preventing geo-blocking, therefore, would put 
that money back into the pockets of creators, providers, and other rights 
holders. As alluded to in paragraph 11 of the Resolution, by preventing geo-
blocking, digital content providers would also have access to larger markets 
and may therefore increase capital. It is clear, therefore, that preventing geo-
blocking is not only in the best interest of European consumers, but also in 
the best interest of creators, providers, or other right holders. The Resolution 
 
 58.  Resolution, supra note 7, ¶¶ 59, 67. 
 59.  Boren, supra note 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 60.  Resolution, supra note 7, ¶ 9. 
 61.  Id. ¶ 11. 
 62.  Id. ¶ 9. 
 63.  See id. ¶¶ 3, 20, 23, 24. 
 64.  Andy, supra note 39. 
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thus calls for a win-win situation for all those interested and for that it is 
commendable. 
 However, the Resolution deserves praise for another reason. Just five 
months after the Resolution was published, the Commission acted on 
Parliament’s call for legislation to address the issue of geo-blocking and 
submitted its Proposal for a regulation ensuring the cross-border portability 
of online content services.65 While a close analysis of the Proposal will be 
presented below, it is enough for now to note that it requires service 
providers to allow subscribers “temporarily present in a Member State to 
access and use the online content service.”66 The Proposal therefore marks 
the Commission’s first move to combat the deleterious practice of geo-
blocking as requested in the Resolution. This move is undoubtedly a step in 
the right direction, and its effect was immediate with Netflix representatives 
commenting, “[w]e” are committed to providing Netflix members with great 
programming wherever they are and are studying the EU’s proposal.”67 
C. Exceptions and Limitations 
Recognizing that the optional nature of the twenty-one exceptions and 
limitations laid out in Article 5 of the InfoSoc Directive has created vast 
discrepancies between Member States’ copyright regimes, the Resolution 
points out “some exceptions and limitations may therefore benefit from more 
common rules.”68 The Resolution therefore appropriately calls upon the 
Commission “to examine the application of minimum standards across the 
exceptions and limitations.”69 The Resolution also asks the Commission to 
review existing exceptions and limitations “in order to better adapt them to 
the digital environment.”70 As harmonization and modernization of the 
copyright regime works towards the goals of the internal market, these 
propositions are certainly praiseworthy. 
The Resolution is also meritorious in that it calls for the creation of 
numerous exceptions to address obstacles brought about by the digital 
revolution as follows: 
 
 
 65.  See generally Proposal, supra note 8. 
 66.  Id. art. 3(1). 
 67.  Kevin Rawlinson, Netflix and Other Services to Be Available on Holiday, BBC NEWS (Dec. 9, 
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-35051054. 
 68.  Resolution, supra note 7, ¶ 37. 
 69.  Id. ¶ 38. 
 70.  Id. ¶ 35. 
    
50 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Vol 17:1 
Paragraph 51 calls for an exception for online and 
cross-border activities for research and education purposes; 
Paragraph 53 calls upon the Commission to consider 
adopting an e-lending exception “allowing public and 
research libraries to legally lend works to the public in 
digital formats for personal use;” and 
Paragraph 54 asks the Commission to consider 
adopting an exception digitalize their collections for 
consulting, cataloging and archiving purposes.71 
 
Providing for such exceptions will allow institutions to effectively 
fulfill their “public interest duty of disseminating knowledge . . . in an up-to-
date manner.”72 Keeping with the droit d’auteur tradition, the Resolution 
asks for fair remuneration for right holders with regard to digital distribution 
of their works which seems to strike an appropriate balance between the 
public interest in accessing works conveniently and right holders’ interests 
in compensation for those works.73 
The Resolution deserves praise not only for calling on the Commission 
to provide for such exceptions, but also for instigating the Commission to 
actually make such changes. The Communication notes that the Commission 
will “consider legislative proposals” that will clarify the scope of the 
exception for digital modes of teaching illustrations, “support remote 
consultation” of library works for academic purposes, and balance the needs 
of cultural heritage institutions and the needs of “born-digital and digitised 
works.”74  As is clear, the Resolution is directly responsible for bringing 
these important issues to the Commission’s attention and prompting it to 
determine legislative solutions. 
 
IV. SHORTCOMINGS OF RESOLUTION 
Although the Resolution makes great strides with regard to modernizing 
European copyright law for the contemporary digital, information society, it 
is not without its shortcomings. The Resolution warrants criticism for 
breaching its duty to promote a clear legal framework for copyright law, 
advocating for a reduction in the duration of copyright protection, and failing 
 
 71.  Id. ¶¶ 51, 53, 54. 
 72.  Id. ¶ 53. 
 73.  See generally Copyright Reform, supra note 10. 
 74.  Communication, supra note 1, at 8. 
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to make a stronger statement on establishing a single European copyright 
title. 
A. Duty to Promote a Clear Legal Framework 
Paragraph Q of the Resolution relates that “EU legislative authorities 
have a duty to promote a clear legal framework for copyright and related 
rights that can be understood by all stakeholders, in particular the general 
public, and that ensures legal certainty.”75 The Resolution, however, fails to 
satisfy this duty, and in fact creates legal uncertainty, by reaffirming the 
principle of territoriality with regard to copyright law as well as taking 
inconsistent stances on geo-blocking and freedom of contract. 
1. The Principle of Territoriality 
Most troublesome about providing legal certainty is the Resolution’s 
affirmation of the principle of territoriality.76 The principle of territoriality 
holds that copyright laws should be determined on a country-by-country 
basis because rights are “acquired and enforced on a country-by-country 
basis.”77 The extent to which this principle should be applied to the EU 
copyright framework in light of the internal market will be discussed below 
in Section V. For now, though, it is enough to note that although there has 
been some EU wide harmonization, copyright and related rights remain 
territorial. The supposed territorial nature of copyright law has thus led 
legislators to leave it up to Member States to decide which exceptions and 
limitations they see fit given their individual cultural values and legal 
traditions. So, on one hand, the legislature has a duty to provide clarity and 
harmonization, and, on the other, the legislature must respect Member 
States’ cultural diversity.78 The optional nature of the exceptions and 
limitations enunciated in Article 5 of the InfoSoc Directive, then, evidences 
a clear attempt by the Commission, Parliament and Council to balance these 
two duties. However, these two duties are not always compatible with each 
other. For example, the optional nature of the twenty-one exceptions or 
limitations allowed for under Article 5 of the InfoSoc Directive means there 
 
 75.  Resolution, supra note 7, ¶ Q. 
 76.  Id. ¶ 6 (the “existence of copyright and related rights inherently implies territoriality”). 
 77.  Tambiama A. Madiega, EU Copyright Reform: Revisiting the Principle of Territoriality, 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERVICES (Sept. 28, 2015), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/568348/EPRS_BRI(2015)568348_EN.pdf. 
 
 78.  See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 151, 
2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
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are 2,097,152 different ways Article 5 may be implemented.79 Clearly, 
harmony took a backseat to cultural diversity in the InfoSoc Directive; but, 
the shortcomings of the InfoSoc Directive do not excuse the shortcomings of 
the Resolution. Rather, the InfoSoc Directive’s shortcomings elevate the 
legislature’s duty to provide uniformity because there is such disconformity 
among Member States’ copyright regimes. It is inapposite, then, to affirm a 
principle which fosters such disharmony. 
2. Geo-Blocking & Content Portability 
Another consequence of applying the principle of territoriality to 
copyright law is that there is not one single European copyright title, but 
rather twenty-eight “separate national ones.”80 Copyright owners therefore 
must obtain licenses in each Member State before their rights can be 
protected in that State.  Because it can be “difficult or impossible to obtain”81 
licenses in all twenty-eight Member States, many right holders do not hold 
licenses in all Member States and are unable to distribute content across the 
entire EU.82 Conversely, right holders may restrict the “territorial scope of 
licenses granted to service providers” thereby limiting the availability of 
those services to particular Member States.83 Service providers themselves 
may further confine their services to particular Member States, even if their 
licenses permit them to offer those services to a multitude of Member 
States.84 Because content is “blocked” from users depending on their 
geographic location, these deleterious practices have been dubbed geo-
blocking. 
As noted above, one central goal of the Resolution is to prohibit geo-
blocking because it interferes with consumers’ rights to content. 
Nevertheless, the Resolution sends mixed signals to the Commission on the 
issue of geo-blocking, at times denouncing it and at others maintaining its 
importance to the audio-visual industry. Consider the following: 
 
Paragraph 9. [C]onsumers are too often denied access 
to certain content services on geographical grounds, which 
runs counter to the objective of [the InfoSoc Directive] of 
implementing the four freedoms of the internal market; 
urges the Commission, therefore, to propose adequate 
 
 79.  FIX COPYRIGHT!, http://www.fixcopyright.eu/. 
 80.  Communication, supra note 1, at 4 n.14. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  See generally Hirst, supra note 3. 
 83.  Communication, supra note 1, at 4. 
 84.  Id. 
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solutions for better cross-border accessibility of services and 
copyright content for consumers; 
Paragraph 11. Stresses that the creative output of the 
EU is one of its richest resources, and those who want to 
enjoy it should be able to pay to do so, even when it is only 
sold in another Member State; and 
Paragraph 14. Emphasises that industry geoblocking 
practices should not prevent cultural minorities living in EU 
Member States from accessing existing content or services 
in their language that are either free or paid for.85 
 
In these paragraphs Parliament seems to have recognized and 
appreciated the effect of geo-blocking on consumers and pushed for 
legislation preventing such practices. The following paragraphs, however, 
disclose a contrary attitude towards the practice of geo-blocking: 
 
Paragraph 13. Points out that the financing, production 
and co-production of films and television content depend to 
a great extent on exclusive territorial licenses . . . that being 
so, emphasises that the ability, under the principle of 
freedom of contract, to select the extent of territorial 
coverage and the type of distribution platform encourages 
investment . . . . 
Paragraph 17. Takes note of the importance of 
territorial licenses in the EU, particularly with regard to 
audiovisual and film production which is primarily based on 
broadcasters’ pre-purchase or pre-financing systems.86 
 
The Resolution thus rallies against geo-blocking practices while 
emphasizing right holders’ ability to contract in such a way as to deny 
Europeans audio-visual content on the basis of their geographic location. 
Even if the above is nothing more than an innocent inconsistency, it is 
nevertheless an inconsistency that is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile. 
Such contrary treatment of geo-blocking can hardly be seen as providing 
legal clarity; in fact, the Commission’s December 2015 proposal regarding 
 
 85.  Resolution, supra note 7, ¶¶ 9, 11, 14. 
 86.  Id. ¶¶ 13, 17. 
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cross-border portability of online content makes it apparent that the 
Resolution far from clarified the EU legislature’s position on the subject.87 
 The Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on Ensuring the Cross-Border Portability of 
Online Content Services in the Internal Market (“the Proposal”) marks the 
first step of the Commission’s Digital Single Market Strategy.88 As its title 
suggests, the Proposal sets forth regulations prohibiting geo-blocking 
practices by requiring that online content services be “portable,” meaning 
accessible, between Member States. Specifically, Article 3(1) of the Proposal 
states that “[t]he provider of an online content service shall enable a 
subscriber who is temporarily present in a Member State to access and use 
the online content service.”89 Article 2 defines “temporarily present” as the 
“presence of a subscriber in a Member State other than the Member State of 
residence.”90 The Proposal defines “Member State of residence” as “the 
Member State where the subscriber is habitually residing.”91 While the 
Proposal is certainly a welcomed improvement towards ridding the EU of 
geo-blocking practices, such practices will not thereby be eliminated. As one 
commentator notes, “the notion of temporality is defined nowhere.”92 Issues 
as to how long or short a stay may be to fall under Article 2(d) will 
undoubtedly arise if the Proposal is adopted without the inclusion of clear 
temporal restrictions. 
Perhaps another consequence of the Resolution’s inconsistent treatment 
of geo-blocking is the Proposal’s own inconsistent treatment of geo-
blocking.  The stated goals of the Proposal are “to remove barriers to cross-
border portability so that the needs of users can be met more effectively” and 
to promote innovation “for the benefit of consumers.”93 Such strong 
statements indicate that the Proposal aims to outright prohibit geo-blocking 
for the benefit of all consumers, not just those temporarily present in another 
Member State. Indeed, the very first paragraph of the Proposal argues 
“barriers that hamper access and use of [] online content services cross 
 
 87.  See generally supra note 8.   
 88.  The Digital Single Market is “one in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital is ensured and where individuals and businesses can seamlessly access and exercise online 
activities under conditions of fair competition, and a high level of consumer and personal data protection, 
irrespective of their nationality or place of residence.” Digital Single Market Strategy, supra note 6, at 3. 
 89.  Proposal, supra note 8, art. 3(1) (emphasis added). 
 90.  Id. art. 2(d). 
 91.  Id. art. 2(c). 
 92.  Eleonora Rosati, BREAKING: EU Commission Unveils Next Steps for Copyright Reform, 
Including Draft Content Portability Regulation, THE IPKAT (Dec. 9, 2015, 11:46 AM), 
http://ipkitten.blogspot.it/2015/12/breaking-eu-commission-unveils-next.html. 
 93.  Proposal, supra note 8, at 2. 
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border should be eliminated.”94 What is more, the Commission actually 
considered a total prohibition on geo-blocking while drafting the Proposal.95 
In limiting Article 3(1) to those “temporarily present” in another Member 
State, however, the Proposal allows for geo-blocking to continue in Europe. 
Specifically, the Proposal fails to provide access to content for those 
Europeans that may be in their “Member State of residence” but who wish 
to enjoy services that are not accessible in that Member State. 
To illustrate the issue, suppose a French citizen, living in France, wants 
to subscribe to a British content provider. The content provider, however, 
does not have a license to distribute its content in France. Under the narrow 
terms of the Proposal, and as a result of the antiquated principle of 
territoriality, the French citizen would still be unable to access that content. 
Because Europeans in their “Member State of residence” may still be denied 
access to content not available in that Member State, geo-blocking will 
continue to exist in Europe and will continue to deprive Europeans of a truly 
free internal market. 
As MEP Julia Reda opined, “geoblocking is a problem that most 
adversely affects those who need access to services that aren’t offered in their 
home countries . . . .”96 Legislation beyond “roaming for Netflix” is therefore 
necessary in order for the four freedoms of the internal market to be fully 
realized.97 By failing to take a clear and consistent stance on geo-blocking, 
the Resolution sent mixed signals to the Commission. As a result, the 
Commission’s Proposal is just as inconsistent as the Resolution, which not 
only creates legal uncertainty, but also fails to provide measures that would 
effectively eliminate geo-blocking in Europe. 
3. Freedom of Contract 
Another inconsistency that fails to allow for legal clarity within the 
copyright framework is the Resolution’s contradictory stance on the freedom 
of contract. Specifically, the Resolution calls for legislation that would 
dictate contractual relationships between authors and other right holders but 
simultaneously stresses the importance of contractual freedom. For instance, 
 
 94.  Id. at 10, ¶ 1. 
 95.  Tom Scourfield, Christ Watson & Poonam Majithia, The EU’s Portability proposal—an 




 96.  Julia Reda, End Geoblocking: We Need More than Just Roaming for Netflix!, JULIA REDA (Dec. 
9, 2015), https://juliareda.eu/2015/12/more-than-just-roaming-for-netflix/. 
 97.  Id. 
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the following paragraphs indicate that a chief concern of the Resolution is to 
preserve contractual freedom in the digital age: 
 
Paragraph 13. [E]mphasises that the ability, under the 
principle of freedom of contract, to select the extent of 
territorial coverage, to select the extent of territorial 
coverage and the type of distribution platform encourages 
investment in films and television content and promotes 
cultural diversity. 
Paragraph 25. [C]alls for improvements to the 
contractual position of authors and performers in relation to 
other rightholders and intermediaries . . . as contractual 
exchanges may be marked by an imbalance of power; 
stresses in this connection the importance of contractual 
freedom.98 
 
On the other hand, the Resolution seems to advocate for statutorily 
imposed bargaining positions or powers: 
Paragraph 24. Deems it indispensable to strengthen the 
position of authors and creators and improve their 
remuneration with regard to the digital distribution and 
exploitation of their works. 
Paragraph 25. [C]alls for improvements to the 
contractual position of authors and performers in relation 
to other rightholders and intermediaries . . . as contractual 
exchanges may be marked by an imbalance of power; 
stresses in this connection the importance of contractual 
freedom. 
Paragraph 29. Points out that, in the fragile ecosystem 
which produces and finances creative work, exclusive rights 
and freedom of contract are key components . . . . 
Paragraph 61. [T]he effective exercise of exceptions or 
limitations, and access to content that is not subject to 
copyright or related rights protection, should not be waived 
by contract or contractual terms. 99 
 
 
 98.  Resolution, supra note 7, at ¶¶ 13 and 25 (emphasis added). 
 99.  Id. at ¶¶ 24, 25, 29, and 61 (emphasis added). 
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Stressing the need for authors, creators, and performers to not be “cut-
out” of the profits of their work certainly shows that Parliament is 
sympathetic to groups that are often underrated or undercompensated in the 
creative sector and that sentiment is certainly well placed. The problem does 
not lie with the Resolution’s intentions, but rather with the language of the 
Resolution as a whole. As some commentators have noted, it “seems 
contradictory” to statutorily improve the contractual position of creators 
while stressing that freedom of contract is a key component of the creative 
sector.100 At least facially this argument makes sense: if certain parties are 
given greater strength by statute and similar statutes limit the length of 
assignments of rights, then the parties are not exactly free to contract 
however they want. It hardly needs to be noted, however, that certain 
freedoms are not absolute. For instance, freedom of speech may be restricted 
in order to respect the rights of others or to protect public order or morals.101 
Accordingly, it may simply be that Parliament believes that protecting 
authors, creators, and performers by statutorily affording them increased 
bargaining power is one such restriction on the freedom of contract. 
Whatever the case may be, it remains unclear how Paragraphs 13 and 25 are 
supposed to fit in with Paragraphs 24, 25, 29 and 61 and this ambiguity—or, 
arguably, this contradiction—further demonstrates that the Resolution failed 
to meet its duty of promoting a clear legal framework for European 
copyright. 
B. Reduction in Duration of Copyright Protection 
Another aspect of the Resolution worthy of criticism is its treatment of 
the duration of copyright protection. As it stands, the duration of protection 
in the EU depends on the type of work for which protection is sought.102  
Under Council Directive 93/98/EEC, authors of literary or artistic works 
enjoy protection for the life of the author plus seventy years after his or her 
death.103 Cinematographic or audiovisual works are similarly protected for 
 
 100.  Christophe Geiger et al., Reaction of CEIPI to the Resolution on the Implementation of 
Directive 2001/29/EC on the Harmonisation of Copyright in the Information Society Adopted by the 
European Parliament on the 9th July 2015, CTR. FOR INT’L INTELL. PROP. L., at 5 (July 24, 2015), 
http://www.ceipi.edu/fileadmin/upload/DUN/CEIPI/Documents/Etudes/CEIPI_statement_on_EU_copy
right_reform_final-1.pdf. 
 101.  Treaty of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19, Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY 
DOC. No. 95-20 (1977), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 102.  See generally Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 Harmonizing the Term of 
Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9 (EC) [hereinafter Directive 
93/98/EEC]. 
 103.  Id. at art. 1. 
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the life of the “principal director” plus seventy years after his or her death.104 
The related rights of performers, phonogram producers, and broadcasting 
organizations, however, are only protected for fifty years following the date 
of the performance or fixation.105 
It is interesting to note that when Council Directive 93/98/EEC was 
passed in 1993, the duration of copyright protection in the United States was 
the life of the author plus fifty years.106 It was argued that American creators 
were therefore disadvantaged “vis a vis their European counterparts.”107 As 
a result, some authors created artificial “legal domiciles for Europe in order 
to gain the benefit of the longer license term.”108 After pressure from 
corporate copyright holders, such as Disney to shore up the discrepancy 
between the EU and the US, Congress adopted the Sonny Bono Copyright 
Term Extension Act of 1998 (“CTEA”). The CTEA amended the Copyright 
Act of 1976 to increase the duration of copyright protection from the life of 
the author plus fifty years to the life of the author plus seventy years.109 
Before examining the Resolution, it is important to identify the reasons 
Council Directive 93/98/EEC extended the term of copyright protection by 
twenty years in the first place. As Paragraph 5 of Council Directive 
93/98/EEC notes, the Berne Convention, which laid out minimum standards 
of copyright protection in signatory states, set the minimum term of 
protection as the life of the author plus fifty years.110 This was “intended to 
provide protection for the author and the first two generations of his 
descendants.”111 Considering the Berne Convention was originally drafted in 
1886, around which time the average person lived to be almost forty-three 
years old, affording copyright protection for the life of the author plus fifty 
years was sufficient.112 By 1993, however, the average lifespan of Europeans 
in 1993 had grown so much that the term set forth in the Berne Convention 
was “no longer sufficient to cover two generations.”113 Most significantly, 
 
 104.  Id. at art. 2. 
 105.  Id. at art. 3. 
 106.  Timothy B. Lee, 15 Years Ago, Congress Kept Mickey Mouse Out of the Public Domain.  Will 
They Do It Again?, THE WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 25, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
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 107.  Id. 
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 109.  See The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105–298, 112 Stat. 2827 § 
102(b)(1) (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)). 
 110.  Directive 93/98/EEC, supra note 101, at ¶ 5. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  See Max Roser, Life Expectancy, OUR WORLD IN DATA (2017), https://ourworldindata.org/life-
expectancy/#rising-life-expectancy-around-the-world. 
 113.  Directive 93/98/EEC, supra note 101, at ¶ 5. 
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the drafters believed that robust copyright protection was necessary to foster 
innovation. Paragraph 11 reads: 
 
Whereas in order to establish a high level of protection 
which at the same time meets the requirements of the 
internal market and the need to establish a legal environment 
conducive to the harmonious development of literary and 
artistic creation in the Community, the term of protection for 
copyright should be harmonized at 70 years after the death 
of the author . . . .114 
 
It is clear, then, that the drafter believed that extending the duration of 
copyright protection to seventy years after the death of the author was vital 
to giving EU copyright holders a high level of protection. Parliament, in 
drafting the Resolution, seems to have shared this sentiment, noting at 
paragraph 19 that “any reform of the copyright framework should be based 
on a high level of protection, since rights are crucial to intellectual creation 
and provide a stable, clear and flexible legal base that fosters investment and 
growth in the creative and cultural sector.”115 
Nonetheless, the Resolution simultaneously “calls on the Commission 
to further harmonise the protection of copyright . . . according to the 
international standards set out in the Berne Convention.”116 Not only does 
such language reveal yet another an internal inconsistency of the Resolution, 
but it most importantly runs contrary to a notable goal of the EU copyright 
regime. As noted above, the goal of the Berne Convention was to compensate 
the author and at least two generations of his decedents.117 To lower the 
duration of copyright in an age where the average European lives to be 
approximately seventy-eight years old would completely undermine that 
goal.118 Furthermore, if the copyright regime “should be based on a high level 
of protection,”119 and Council Directive 93/98/EEC specifically noted that a 
term of protection extending seventy years after the death of the author is 
necessary “in order to establish a high level of protection,”120 it is entirely 
contrary to the goals of the EU copyright reform to advocate a reduction in 
 
 114.  Id. at ¶ 11 (emphasis added). 
 115.  Resolution, supra note 7, at ¶ 19 (emphasis added). 
 116.  Id. at ¶ 32. 
 117.  Directive 93/98/EEC, supra note 101, at ¶ 5. 
 118.  See Average Life Expectancy* in Europe for Those Born in 2017, By Gender and Region (In 
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the term of protection. Not only does the Resolution fail to promote a clear 
copyright framework in this regard, but also seeks to diminish the rights of 
copyright holders and for that the Resolution deserves significant criticism. 
C. Single European Copyright Title 
A final shortcoming worth pointing out is the Resolution’s lackluster 
request for the Commission “to study the impact of a single European 
Copyright Title.”121 As will be discussed extensively in Sections V and VI, 
such a system is “crucial for the development of a truly European 
information society.”122 Accordingly, some commentators have referred to 
the Resolution’s rather weak statement on the subject as a “missed 
opportunity to make a stronger statement on some essential issues of 
copyright law in the EU.”123 Rather than calling on the Commission to 
consider the option, it would have been stronger to call on the Commission 
to actually establish such a system. 
Parliament’s failure to take a more progressive stance with regard to 
establishing a single European copyright title is, in turn, reflected in the 
Commission’s recent Communication. Because a single European copyright 
title “would require substantial changes in the way our rules work today,” 
the Commission believes an incremental approach is necessary.124 Thus, 
such an incremental approach renders the establishment of a single European 
copyright title nothing more than a “long-term vision for copyright in the 
EU.”125 
It should also be recalled that the whole purpose of the Communication 
was to set out “how the Commission intends to achieve the goal of a ‘more 
modern, more European copyright framework.’”126 Yet, similar to how the 
Resolution merely calls on the Commission to “study the impact”127 of a 
single European copyright title, the Communication simply asserts that the 
EU “should pursue”128 establishing such a system. Failing to state that it will 
pursue a single European copyright title implies that establishing such a 
system is not part of the Commission’s plan to achieve a “more modern, 
 
 121.  Resolution, supra note 7, at ¶ 28. 
 122.  Geiger et al., supra note 99, at 2. 
 123.  Id. 
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more European copyright framework.”129 As a result, some commentators 
have dismissed this language as nothing more than the Commission’s 
attempt to reserve the “right to dream about full copyright harmonisation.”130 
Others have also warned that “the Commission’s ‘gradual approach’ to 
copyright reform must not retract into a ‘wait-and-see’ one,” fearing that the 
Communication “signals diminished momentum from the Commission” to 
provide meaningful copyright reform.131 By “tak[ing] into account”132 the 
uninspiring language of the Resolution with regard to establishing a single 
European copyright title, the Communication relates a similarly uninspiring 
position on the subject. The Resolution, therefore, warrants criticism for 
failing to make a stronger statement on the subject. 
V. DUTY TO ESTABLISH A SINGLE EUROPEAN 
COPYRIGHT TITLE 
The principle of conferral, as set forth in Article 5(2) of the Treaty on 
European Union (“TEU”), states that the EU legislature may only enact EU-
wide laws in areas the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(“TFEU”) or TEU (collectively, “the Treaties”) grants it the exclusive 
competence to do so and where the law furthers the objectives of the 
Treaties.133 Areas where the EU legislature has exclusive competence 
include customs union, “common commercial policy,” monetary policy for 
Eurozone members,134 common fisheries policy, and “competition rules for 
the functioning of the internal market.”135 If the proposed law falls outside 
an area in which the EU legislature has exclusive competence, the legislature 
may nevertheless share competence with the Member States.136 Shared 
competence exists in a number of different areas, the most important to this 
 
 129.  Id. at 2. 
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content portability regulation, supra note 91. 
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copyright, EUROISPA (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.euroispa.org/content-portability-proposal-
encouraging-greater-ambition-required-modernise-copyright/. 
 132.  Communication, supra note 1, at 3. 
 133.  Ana Ramalho, Conceptualizing the European Union’s Competence in Copyright – What Can 
the EU Do?, 45 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 178, 178–179 (2014); see Consolidated Version of the 
Treaty on European Union art. 5, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 13 [hereinafter TEU]. 
 134.  Eurozone members are those Member States whose currency is the euro: Austria, Belgium, 
Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. See The Euro, EUROPEAN UNION (Jan. 
6, 2016), https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/money/euro_en#euro. 
 135.  TFEU, supra note 78, at art. 3. 
 136.  Id. at art. 4. 
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analysis being the functioning of the internal market.137 In such a case, the 
EU legislature must satisfy two other principles before the law can be 
enacted.138 First, the law must not offend the principle of subsidiarity, 
meaning the law’s objectives “cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States” or are “better achieved at Union level.”139 Next, the law 
must “not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the 
Treaties.”140 This rule is known as the principle of proportionality.141 
Thus, in order to establish that the EU legislature has a duty to enact a 
single European copyright title, it must be shown that the EU legislature has 
the necessary competence to do so and that Union level action will further 
the objectives of the Treaties. 
A. Competence Under Article 118 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union 
The principal goal of the Treaty of Rome was to establish political unity 
via economic equality.142 For economic equality to exist, there must be an 
internal market, meaning “an area without internal frontiers in which the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured.”143 Because 
intellectual property encompasses both goods and services, Article 118 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) states that: 
 
In the context of the establishment and functioning of 
the internal market, the European Parliament and the 
Council, acting in accordance with ordinary legislative 
procedure, shall establish measures for the creation of 
European intellectual property rights to provide uniform 
protection of intellectual property rights throughout the 
Union and for the setting up of centralised Union-wide 
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 138.  TEU, supra note 132, at art. 5. 
 139.  Id. 
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 143.  TFEU, supra note 78, at art. 26. 
 144.  Id. at art. 118 (emphasis added). 
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Although the Treaties do not expressly grant the EU legislature with 
exclusive competence over copyright,145 Article 118 clearly grants to it 
competence over intellectual property rights.146 Because copyright is a form 
of intellectual property,147 it follows that Article 118 provides the EU 
legislature competence over copyright. It remains unclear from the language 
of the statute, however, whether the EU legislature possesses exclusive 
competence with respect to intellectual property or merely shares 
competence with the Member States.  Although the case law resolving this 
issue concerns uniform patent protection,148 the decision should extend to 
uniform copyright protection as both are simply species of intellectual 
property.149 
In Joined Cases C-274/11 and C-295/11, Italy and Spain challenged the 
Council’s decision to permit twenty-five Member States150 to create a unitary 
patent via enhanced cooperation.151 Enhanced cooperation is a power set 
forth in Articles 326–334 of the TFEU which allows a minimum of nine 
Member States to “establish advanced integration or cooperation . . . without 
the other EU countries.”152 The unitary patent system at issue in the joined 
cases provides uniform patent protection in all participating Member States 
upon registration with the European Patent Office.153 Italy and Spain’s main 
contention, however, lied with the language provisions of the unitary patent 
system.154 The countries argued that because the system’s official languages 
are English, German, and French,155 parties who are not native speakers of 
 
 145.  Ramalho, supra note 132, at 179. 
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those languages would be disadvantaged in the prosecution process.156 In 
attacking the validity of the unitary patent system, the countries argued that 
creation of such a system was within the exclusive competence of the EU 
legislature under Article 118 TFEU.157 According to this argument, the 
Member States therefore lacked the requisite competence to provide uniform 
patent protection and doing so via enhanced cooperation usurped the role of 
the legislature.158 
The Court of Justice of the European Union began its analysis by noting 
that the power, or competence, to provide uniform protection of intellectual 
property rights is conferred within “the context of the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market” under Article 118 TFEU.159 Because the 
functioning of the internal market is an area of shared competence under 
Article 4 of the TFEU, the court reasoned that Member States and EU 
legislature therefore share competence to provide uniform protection of 
intellectual property rights.160 Accordingly, the court held that enhanced 
cooperation validly established the unitary patent system.161 
Because copyright is a form of intellectual property, Joined Cases C-
274/11 and C-295/11 established that the EU legislature has shared 
competence over copyright. Keeping this in mind, the unambiguous, 
prescriptive language of Article 118 becomes extremely significant. It states 
that Parliament and the Council “shall” take measures to provide uniform 
protection of intellectual property rights, not merely that they “may.”162 
Thus, not only does the EU legislature have the power to establish measures 
providing uniform protection of intellectual property rights, as a number of 
scholars have noted,163 but also an obligation to do so.164 It follows that if 
there is not uniform protection of intellectual property rights throughout the 
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EU, then Parliament and the Council must take measures to provide for such 
uniformity. 
With this in mind, it is important to note that Article 118 TFEU 
explicitly states that Parliament and the Council must act “in accordance with 
ordinary legislative procedure.”165 Under the “ordinary legislative 
procedure,” the Commission submits a proposal that Parliament and the 
Council will either approve or amend.166 If necessary, the proposal will go 
through a series of amendment procedures, after which Parliament and the 
Council will make a final vote either for or against the proposal becoming 
EU-wide law.167 
Although neither Parliament nor the Council have the ability to draft 
legislation on their own initiative,168 Article 225 of the TFEU allows 
Parliament to ask the Commission to submit a proposal on any matter 
Parliament believes is “required for the purpose of implementing the 
Treaties.”169 Accordingly, if there is no uniform protection of intellectual 
property rights, Parliament and the Council have a duty to do one of three 
things: (1) request the Commission to submit then amend and/or approve any 
proposal that provides uniform protection of intellectual property rights; (2) 
amend any proposal regarding intellectual property rights so that it provides 
uniform protection of said rights and ultimately approve it; or (3) approve 
any proposal that provides uniform protection of intellectual rights from the 
outset. 
As noted above, there are 2,097,152 different ways Article 5 of the 
InfoSoc Directive may be implemented.170 Moreover, different Member 
States have, in fact, adopted different exceptions and limitations such that 
considerable disconformity exists between the copyright regimes of the 
twenty-eight Member States.171 To make matters worse, the Resolution— 
whose explicit goal was to promote clarity within the copyright regime172—
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is ripe with discrepancies and ambiguities that have already complicated the 
EU copyright reform effort by creating similar inconsistencies and 
ambiguities in both the Proposal and Communication.  
As is clear, uniform copyright protection across the EU does not 
currently exist. Therefore, Parliament and the Council have a duty to take 
any of the three steps identified above in order to provide uniform copyright 
protection. Because the EU legislature’s competence over copyright is 
shared with the Member States,173 any measure providing uniform copyright 
protection must not offend the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality.174 
B. Necessity and Propriety of a Single European 
Copyright Title 
Because Article 118 TFEU does not specify how uniform protection of 
intellectual property rights must be obtained, uniform copyright protection 
may be provided by creating a single European copyright title as long as 
doing so will not offend the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.175 
In other words, it must be shown that EU-wide, rather than national, 
legislation is necessary to provide uniform copyright protection and that a 
single European copyright title does not “exceed what is necessary” to the 
functioning of the internal market.176 
1. Principle of Subsidiarity 
Under the principle of subsidiarity, EU level action may only be taken 
if “the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by 
the Member States” or are “better achieved at Union level.”177 The first step, 
then, is to identify the objectives a single European copyright title would 
serve. As Article 118 TFEU itself reports, the objective of any measure 
establishing a European intellectual property right is “to provide uniform 
protection of intellectual property rights throughout the Union.”178 
 
 173.  Joined Cases C-274/11 & C-295/11, 2013 E.C.R. I-240, ¶ 25. 
 174.  TEU, supra note 132, at art. 5. 
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 177.  Article 5(3) states: Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its 
exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, 
but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.  
TEU, supra note 132, at art. 5. 
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Embedded in Article 118 TFEU, however, is also the underlying objective 
to foster the internal market.179 A single European copyright title’s objective, 
therefore, must be to provide uniform copyright protection and to further the 
internal market. 
Next, it must be established that these objectives cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States or are “better achieved at Union level.”180  
To begin, over the past twenty-five years, the EU legislature has adopted 
approximately ten directives aimed at incrementally harmonizing the 
copyright framework.181 While this piecemeal approach has been moderately 
successful in providing some minimum standards of copyright protection at 
the EU level, it has done so at “considerable expense” as it can often take up 
to ten years and vast sums of taxpayers’ money for a directive to be passed, 
translated, and transposed by Member States.182 As such, the harmonization 
approach is inherently ill equipped to promptly respond to the digital 
revolution where a “dynamic information market” is constantly evolving.183 
As one commentator has put it, “the harmonisation agenda of the EC has 
resulted in an almost non-stop process of amending the national laws on 
copyright and related rights.”184 
To make matters worse, Member States may not even be amending 
national copyright laws in the same way given that Article 5 of the InfoSoc 
Directive allows Member States to adopt exceptions and limitations—which 
thereby dictate the scope of copyright protection—as they see fit.185 In truth, 
the optional nature of Article 5 of the InfoSoc Directive has made uniform 
copyright protection virtually impossible because Member States have in 
fact adopted different exceptions.186 Perhaps the strongest indication that 
uniform copyright protection cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States is the fact that Member States could have adopted the same exceptions 
listed in Article 5 of the InfoSoc Directive but did not. 
Furthermore, the Resolution and its progeny make the prospect of 
uniform copyright protection occurring on the Member States’ own volition 
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all the more dismal because the ambiguities and discrepancies therein further 
muddle the copyright regime and allow for differences in protection amongst 
Member States.187 It is true that Member States could propose enhanced 
cooperation measures similar to those which established the unitary patent 
system, but because participation is voluntary truly uniform protection may 
not exist should Member States refuse to participate.188 Given the above, 
uniform copyright protection cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States. At the very least, the overwhelming success of the Community 
Trademark,189 an EU-wide trademark system that allows mark owners to file 
a single application and gain uniform protection in all Member States,190 
demonstrates that uniform copyright protection would be better achieved at 
the Union level. 
The EU legislature is similarly better equipped than Member States to 
sufficiently achieve the single European copyright title’s second objective of 
advancing the internal market. The internal market is “an area without 
internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital is ensured.”191 Ideally, the internal market would ensure that 
companies are free to “provide or receive services in a Member State other 
than the one where the company or consumer is established.”192 However, 
“fragmentation and barriers that do not exist” in the physical context have 
prevented a digital single market, meaning one where “individuals and 
businesses can seamlessly access and exercise online activities . . . 
irrespective of their nationality or place of residence,” from thriving.193 For 
example, “territoriality has led to fragmentation of markets along national 
borderlines” and allowed geo-blocking to become commonplace, 
particularly with respect to copyright content.194 Such practices thereby 
inhibit the free movement of services and do not advance the internal 
market.195 Because removing such artificial restrictions on the free 
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movement of copyright content and services would require cooperation by 
each Member State, the EU legislature would best able to achieve the single 
European copyright title’s objective of promoting the functioning of the 
internal market. 
In light of the foregoing, it is clear that the single European copyright 
title’s dual objectives of providing uniform copyright protection and 
furthering the internal market cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States and are “better achieved at Union level.”196 Accordingly, the principle 
of subsidiarity is not offended and the EU legislature may lawfully unify EU 
copyright law provided the principle of proportionality is similarly 
unoffended. 
2. Principle of Proportionality 
The principle of proportionality limits the EU legislature’s power to 
“what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.”197 Measures are 
deemed disproportionate “only where no objectively defensible 
consideration can justify recourse to a specific method intended to attain a 
given objective.”198 Other cases have considered measures disproportionate 
where they are “manifestly inappropriate . . . to the objective . . . the 
competent institution is seeking to pursue.”199 It appears, therefore, that great 
deference is given to legislative bodies and only when the means far 
outweigh the end objective will a measure violate the principle of 
proportionality. Among the objectives of the Treaties are to ensure the 
“functioning of the internal market” and to “provide uniform protection of 
intellectual property rights throughout the Union.”200 In the context of 
creating a single European copyright title, then, as long as the measure is not 
manifestly inappropriate to these objectives, the principle of proportionality 
will not be violated. 
Although a single European copyright title “would require substantial 
changes in the way [EU copyright] rules work,”201 nothing short of 
unification would sufficiently serve the objectives of providing “uniform 
protection of intellectual property rights throughout the Union” and ensuring 
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the “functioning of the internal market.”202 As noted above, the optional 
nature of Article 5 of the InfoSoc Directive allowed Member States to 
provide uniform copyright protection by adopting the same exceptions and 
limitations, but they did not.203 Member States may also, at any time, engage 
in enhanced cooperation to provide uniform copyright protection, but they 
have not.204 In any event, participation in enhanced cooperation is voluntary, 
so such measures may not provide uniform copyright protection if even one 
Member State refuses to participate.205 Measures at the national level, 
therefore, are an incredibly unlikely source of uniform copyright protection. 
By contrast, the overwhelming success of the Community Trademark 
(“CTM”), demonstrates that uniform copyright protection is best achieved 
by a single European copyright title.206 Under this system, mark owners may 
file a single trademark registration that entitles the mark to uniform 
protection in all Member States.207 Although Regulation 40/49 left national 
trademark systems intact, these systems have been substantially harmonized 
by Directives 2008/95/EC and 2015/2436.208 With over ten directives and 
numerous other legislative documents already comprising the EU copyright 
framework,209 many claim, “the next logical step in this process towards 
uniformity of European copyright law would be the introduction of a truly 
unified European Copyright Law.”210 
As established above, providing uniform copyright protection and 
ensuring the functioning of the internal market are objectives best achieved 
at EU, rather than national, level. Of course, the precise mechanics must be 
devised by the legislature, but a single European copyright title “would 
establish a truly unified legal framework, replacing the multitude of—often 
opaque and sometimes conflicting—national rules that presently exists.”211 
This would ensure that what is legal in one Member State is not illegal in 
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another and thereby achieve the objective of uniform protection of 
intellectual property rights. 
A single European copyright title would also ensure the functioning of 
the internal market by ending the anachronistic application of territoriality to 
copyright. Although the European audiovisual industry has maintained that 
territoriality is needed to “preserve sustainable financing,” which is generally 
“based on territorial licensing combined with the territorial exclusivity 
granted to individual distributors or service providers,”212 culture in the 
digital age “is not confined to national borders.”213 As such, territoriality has 
actually prevented “service providers and distributors from providing cross-
border ‘portability’ of services.”214 As the European Copyright Society has 
argued, a single European copyright title, then, is “the only way a fully 
functioning Digital Single Market,” and therefore a fully functioning internal 
market, “can ultimately be achieved.”215 It follows that such a system is not 
only proportionate, but also necessary to providing uniform protection and 
promoting the internal market. The principle of proportionality, therefore, 
would not be offended by a single European copyright title. 
In sum, Union, rather than national, level legislation is necessary to 
ensure uniform copyright protection and the functioning of the internal 
market. Because a single European copyright title would not “exceed what 
is necessary” to achieve these objectives, the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality would not be violated.216 Accordingly, the EU legislature 
must satisfy its duty to provide uniform copyright protection under Article 
118 TFEU by establishing a single European copyright title. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For calling to preserve the freedom of panorama, recognizing 
consumers’ rights, and urging of new exceptions and limitations to better fit 
the digital age, the Resolution is undoubtedly commendable. Perhaps equally 
as laudable is the fact that it served as a catalyst for change, prompting a 
proposed regulation on the cross-border portability of online content by the 
Commission and a communication outlining its plans to achieve “a more 
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modern, more European copyright framework” just six months after it was 
released.217 
The Resolution and its progeny, however, are not without their 
shortcomings. For instance, the Resolution laments geo-blocking as a threat 
to the free movement of goods and services, yet affirms the principle of 
territoriality, which allows for and encourages geo-blocking.218 What is 
worse, this inconsistency was apparently transposed in the Proposal in that 
the Proposal similarly denounces geo-blocking yet does not outright ban the 
practice.219 Moreover, the Resolution purports to be based on a “high level 
of protection” yet calls on the Commission to lower the term of copyright 
protection by twenty years.220 Perhaps the most frustrating shortcoming of 
the Resolution is Parliament’s vapid request for the Commission to simply 
“study the impact of a single European Copyright Title” rather than rallying 
the Commission to create one.221 This uninspiring request had a similarly 
uninspiring effect, with the Commission merely noting that the EU “should 
pursue” a single European copyright title.222 
These shortcomings not only confuse the copyright framework, but also 
perpetuate the struggles EU copyright law already faces. For example, by 
affirming the principle of territoriality, the Resolution and its progeny 
continue to fracture the internal market, particularly the digital single market 
the Commission is striving to create.223 Furthermore, the Resolution’s note 
that “some exceptions and limitations may [] benefit from more common 
rules” does not adequately resolve the issues raised by the optional nature of 
Article 5 of the InfoSoc Directive because differences in copyright protection 
could still exist between Member States.224 The existing and inevitable 
differences resulting from the Resolution and its progeny with respect to 
national copyright regimes contravene the EU legislature’s duty to provide 
uniform protection of intellectual property rights under Article 118 TFEU.225 
Because a single European copyright is necessary to provide uniform 
copyright protection and ensure the functioning of the internal market, the 
EU legislature has a duty to establish a single European copyright title. 
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Although a single European copyright title “may be considered 
undesirable, or perhaps too drastic, by certain stakeholders and national 
legislatures . . . it is in fact the logical next step for the EU legislature to take 
in this field.”226 Such a title would afford uniform copyright protection 
because there would be just one, EU-wide copyright regime that all Member 
States must adhere to, rather than twenty-eight separate ones.227 This, in turn, 
would “enhance legal security and transparency” as Europeans would no 
longer need to consider a multitude of copyright systems just to make sure 
their activities are permissible.228 A single European copyright title would 
necessarily entail a central copyright office similar to the Office for 
Harmonization in the Internal Market, which manages CTM registrations.229 
If a consolidated recording system for transfers of copyright ownership were 
included at this copyright office, legal security and transparency would be 
even further increased because parties could look at one set of records to 
verify the validity of their transfers. In turn, this would “greatly reduce 
transaction and enforcement costs.”230 Given the “considerable ‘time, 
finance, and other social costs’” associated with incremental harmonization, 
a unified system may ultimately cost the EU less than incremental 
harmonization by an endless string of directives over the long run.231 A single 
European copyright title would also eliminate territoriality with respect to 
copyright. This would prohibit the now commonplace yet deleterious 
practice of geo-blocking and allow for true cross-border portability of online 
content services in the internal market. According to the European Copyright 
Society, this is “the only way a fully functioning Digital Single Market” can 
be achieved, without which there cannot be truly free movement of goods 
and services as required by the internal market.232 
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